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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

LEON STl'"CI(I,
Plaintiff and Respondent~
vs.
J ...\.i\IES

ELLIS, W. H.
STEWART, JUNE S.
SPA C K~I AN, CI.JARE
SP.A.CKl\fAN, THOMAS A.
TARBET (one of the Defendents and the Appellant)
and }fAGNUS OLSEN,
Defendent, and Appellant
Thomas A. Tarbet.

BRIEF AND ARGUOF
APPEl~MENT
LANT
.L·\.••
THOMAS
rARBET.

STATEMENT OF FACTS_
On the 16th day of October, 1945, Clare Spackman
and June S. Spackman were the owners of a small
home and lot in Logan, Utah, and on that day they
sold the property to the defendent James Ellis, who
with his wife and family moved into occupancy thereof.
Ellis and his wife had two or three small children. The
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Spackmans were at all tirnes concerned with this case,
a married couple with one child (Tr. 46) and had no
other property in lTtah. They were residents of Utah,
and the daughter and son-in law, respectively, of defendent W. H. Stewart.
T4e plaintiff knew that Ellis was a married man
residing in Utah, upon the property in question with
his family. (Tr. 30). The property in que:stion was
never worth in excess of the fair cash value of $1500.00,
\vhich sum "\vas the final purchase price to the Appellant. This is not denied by the reply of plaintiff, and
which amount is not in controversy in this case.
Tho1nas A_. Tarbet was the head of a family. His
Father died in June, 1942, prior to his entry upon Inilitary duties in May, 1943 ( Tr. 89). His Mother consid~
ered Thomas head of the family after the death of
her husband. He supported her and her invalid daughter (his sister) (Tr. 84-85). \Vhile he was in the military service he supported his Mother and Sister, and
upon his return from the Service he came back home
and \\Tent to work and used his earnings to supports the
family. They. had no other Ineans of support and the
Mother considered him the head of the family. (Tr. 85).
The daughter had been in the American Fork School
and could only do housework at honte. This testimony
is undisputed and in fact is not controverted even by
\nference. ~rom, his Mother and Sister lived as a family
until Tom was 1narried on the 23rd of ~1arch, 1946, and
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lived 'vith his "Tife in the hon1e of his 1'lother until he
n1oved into the ho1ne 'vhich he purchased fron1 Ellis on
February 25th. 1~)4{), on ".-hich date Ellis was occupying
the property with his fa1nily. (Tr. 93). There was no
break in the continuity of his being the head of" a family
at any thne. Since Ellis had not paid in full for the property he had not received the deeds, and therefore, the
deed "~as taken directly front the Spackmans to Tarbet
(Tr. 59} and both the Spaclnuans and Ellis were paid in
full by Tarbet, \vho received a deed (Cross Defs. Ex.
No.2). (Defs. Ex. "D"- Tr. 62, being the settlement to
Ellis). The abstract of title 'vas brought down to date
at the time of the purchase of the property. (Deed fro1n
Spaclm1ans dated l\farch 1, 1964, (Tr. 67), \vhich sho~ed
1narketable title in the Spaclnnans, (Tr. 72, Ex. "I".)
Tarbet knew nothing of any claimed lien by plaintiff,
and on ~!arch 15th, 1946, the plaintiff filed in the office
of the County Recorder of Cache County, Utah, the
~fechanic's Lien attached to plaintiff's complaint.

· All

of the parties were residents of Cache County,
Utah (See allegation of residence as to the Spackman ~s
in deed set forth in Tarbet's Amended Answer and
Cross-Complaint).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. That the Court erred .in finding in .favor of the
Plaintiff and Respondent, and against this Defendent
and Appellant, and in entering and signing its JudgeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
ment and Decree of Foreclosure of I\Iechanic 's Lien.
2.

That the Court erred in entering and

~aking

it's

finding of Fact No. 7, and Conclusion of Law based
thereon - No. 2.
STATEMENT O:B, ISSUES
1. Does a homestead exemption run with a transfer
of the property, and 1nay the exernption be asserted by
the grantee to defeat a mechanic's lien which pre-dates
the transfer of the property to the grantee~
ARGUMENT
The facts are simple and the issues narro"red to the
only important 1natter to be decided-·namely: even
though Ellis and the Spackmans did not take any affirrnative action to impress the character of a homestead on
the property, may Tarbet now do so~ And, was Tarbet
the "head of a family"~
These will be taken up in the order stated.
Without reference to any of the decisions, the matter
is set at rest by our statute-UCA 1943, 38-0-2. EFFECT OF CONVEYANCE-PROCEEDS OF SALE
EXEMPT. ''When a homestead is conveyed by the
owner thereof such conveyance shall not subject the
prerr1ises to any lien or encu1nbrance to "rhich it would
not be subject in the hands of the owner ... " The remainder of the section applys to the proceeds of the
sale and is not pertinent. The language iH Ri1nple and
can Inean only one thing, i. e, if the ho1nestead exemption
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could have been asserted by Ellis or the Spackrnan~,
then the eonYeyance to Tarbet vvould not subpect the
property to the lien of the l)laintiff. The rule is well
stated in 40 C. J. S., p. 612. dit is a well established
general rule, alrnost universally followed; that when a
ho1nestead is sold the exe1npt character of the horne~tead property existing at the time of the sale runs
\Vith the transfer and as. far as the rights of the pur-·
chaser are concerned, no clain1 of judgement against the
vendor can be asserted against the property which could
not be enforced during the tiine the debtor occupied it
as a residence.'' Note in 65 A. L. R., p. 1209.
The conveyance does not place the creditor in any bei~
ter position than he was before the transfer. Campbell
vs. Largillie~e Co., Bankers, 256 P. 371, (Idaho) : "Jf
the property was exempt before the conveyance, we fail
to see what rights the judgernent creditor gains by the
transfer. A guarantee of a hornestead holds it free fro1n
a judgement \\rhich could not have been asserted against
it 'vhen it remained the ho1nestead of his grantor." The
rule is so even though a transfer of the property is ·mado
for the ·purpose of defeating creditors. Daniels vs.
Smith, 169 Pac. 267,.(Utah), Brennecke vs. Rieman, 102
S. W. (2d) 874, (Mo.), 109 A. L. R. 1214. Custer vs.
Block, et aL 82 P. 2d 282, (N. -M.). "There was no
evidence offered as to the value of the horne stead. We
cannot presume that its value exceeded the homstead
exe1nption. We held in Corn v. Hyde, 26 N. M. 36, 188
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P. 1102, that property exe1npt. as a ho1nestead could be
conveyed free from a judgen1ent lien". Citing with approval Brennecke vs. Rie1nan, supra. Oklahoma State
Bank v. \Tan Hassel, et al, 114 P. 2d 912 (Okla.), Rawleigh Co., vs. Grosclose, et al, 49 P. 2d 1085 (Okla.),
Dreyfus v. Dickason, 56 P. 2d 881.
So far as the writer has been able to discover there
are only two states in the t7. S. holding to the

contrary~

namely, Lousiana and North Carolina, but even these
are not necessarily contrary because of the statuatory
provisions of the homestead acts. See 40 C. J. S. 613,
note 98. In comparing the rulings in these two States
it will be noted that our Statute (38-0-2) prevents just
what the rulings in Louisiana and North Carolina
permit.
Certainly the equities 1n this case are with Tarbet,
and not with Stucki.
Stucki had an opportunity to protect hilnself by
requiring security in advance of any labor or materia]
furnished. Tarbet had none. He did what a nor1nal person would do even though he was young and inexperienced. He secured a warranty deed and abstract of
title, and when he paid over the full purchase price he
had no means of knowing that Stucki clainted a lien on
the premises. The thoroughly considered case of
Panaopulos v. lVfanning, 69 P. 2d 614, (lTtah), holds
that a homestead right is not a n1ere privilege, but is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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an absolutP right, \veil ~tate~ the public policy in this
state as follo\vs: ""it (hon1estead la,v) was an enlightened public polic~-, looking to the general welfare as well
a~ to that of the individual citizen, which dictated the

passage of the hornestead act; and the obvious intent
of the act is to secure to every
., householder or head ofa farnily a horne, a place of residence, which he may
intproYe and 1nake con1fortable, and where the farnily
may be sheltered and live beyond the reach of those
financial rnisfortunes \vhich even the most prudent and.
sagacious cannot always avoid.''
There bas been rnuch eloquent language used by this
Court and all Courts of our land upon the question of
public policy vvith relation to homestead exemption,
and these are contrary to the holding of the Court belo\\1
'""here he said: (Tr. 103-104) "As I understand the statute 'vith respect to ho1nestead exemptions, it doesn't
n1ean a mechanic's lien just cannot take effect as against
property that n1ight be claimed as a homestead that
the lien is enforceable until the homestead, exemption
is claimed, and unless that is done the lien certainly
should be valid and subsisting.'' Then again: ''I believe
that this homestead exemption is an exemption which
is n1ore or less a personal one, that is one which attaches
to the person or for the benefit of the persons involved
-that is the family-for their protection, and that it
does not attach to the property itself, but that is a right
\vhich the individual ha::; to clai1n, and it isn't like a
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blue block put in with a number of other blocks, all the
time carrying this one particular exernption attached
to that property". Of course, the Court's reasoning is
just contrary to the expressions .of this Higher Court.
Utah Builders' Supply Co. v. Gardner, 39 P. 2d 327
(Utah). " ... such rights are founded upon public policy
for the protection of the home and the prosperity of th~"
state (Italicizing mine) carrying out the policy of
republics to encourage and multiply freeholders, the
natural supporters and defenders of a free government
. . . (quoting V olker-Scrowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance,
32 Utah 74, 88 P. 896) a hon1estead right is for the
benefit of the family, and such right cannot be frittered
away even by the head of a farnily". So it is not a right
which Ellis could have "frittered away" by not asserting it. But further than this, the mechanic's lien was
void. The Utah Builders' Supply case (supra) holds
just that with relation to judgements. If a judgement
lien is void, so is a mechanic's lien. They are both creatures of statute and nothing more. Quoting from the
Utah Builders' Supply case again: ''It has become the
settled law of this state that an execution levied upon
premises constituting a homestead of a judgement
debtor is absolutely void, not merely voidable. Antelope
Shearing Corral Co. vs. Cons. Wagon and Mach. Co.,
G4 Utah 355, 180 P. 597. The case also held that a
judgement cannot become a lien upon the judgement
creditor's homestead, that an execution or attahc1nent
levied thereon is void, and therefore an .order of sale
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l\ntered by thP court is equally i1upotent ". And so

i~

the deeree ordering the foreclosure and sale of the property in this ea::;e void, and not ruerPly voidable.
As to Assignrnent of Error No. 2, it is of course
entirely in line \Yith the la::;t quotation to state, that
if the lien \vas Yoid, and not rnerely voidable, than tl1e
sale to Tarbet, could not revive the mechanic's lien. It
"·as '~stillborn'', and there \vas nothing to revive. No
reasonable nlind can disagree writh the premise that
Tarbet \vas not the head of the family. The Mother
considered hirn so; he worked at Bushnell for over $59
per 'veek. 'vas the sole support of the family; alloted
his pay \vhile in the Service to his Mother; came home
and went to \York again. The only other contribution to
her support 'vas from the Public Welfare while he was
in the Service, and after he n1arried. The right to proceed against a homestead, claimed exempt, places the
burden of proof on the ·one asserting the right to proceed. De Priest vs. Ransom, 193 P. 2d 191 (Kan.) ·Advance Sheet, June 11, 1948.
In reliance upon the question as to whether or not
~rarbet 'vas "head of the family" the unreversed case
of Bunker vs. Coons, 60 P. 549 (Utah), is cited. About
the only difference being is that Bunker owned title to
the property consisting of the homestead of the family,
and in the case at bar, the Mother of Tarbet .owned the
residence. The ownership of 1)roperty is not deterininative of the question: "Who is head of .the fa1nilyo?"
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Bunker was the son of a w·ido'v. So is Tarbet. Bunk,_:r
was the sole support of the family. So was Tarbet.
Ilunker was absent frorn the hon1estead for a year or

t"'O as a freighter. So was Tarbet as a soldier. Bunker
came back and lived with his l\1:other. So did Tarbet.
Bunker, when he came back used the proceeds of his
labor to support his Mother. So did Tarbet. Turn to
page 91 of the Transcript: (After return from l\filitary
Service). 0. "Where did you go from the station at
\vhich you "rere discharged~'' ''A. . . . At Home'' . . .
''And who was living there then~ A. My Sister and my
~!other .. Q. Did they have any Ineans of support so far
as you could see other than what they had '5een receiving
from the- A. No sir. Q. Now 'vhat did you do in
the way of employment~ A. At first I had quite a time
getting a job. Well, I had saved quite a little bit while
I was in the service, and we used that. About fifteen or
t"renty days after I got a job at the Baugh Motor. Q.
And have you been employed continuously ever since
then ~ A. Yes.
The writer does not actually believe that the lower
Court well considered its finding No. 7 and Conclusion
No.2. Refer to page 85 of the Transcript and recall that
l\1rs. Tarbet's husband had died leaving her with a
daughter who had been committed to the American Fork
School, and one son who went into the Military Service.
'' Q. Did he go to work between the time he caine ho1ne
fron1 Japan and when he got married? Did he work be·
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fore he got n1arried '? ••• 4\. 'Yhy ~n rp, he vvorked all the
tiine. Q. ''rhat did he do \Yi th his n1oney '? A. Gave it to
the house. (~. Did you have an~r otht>r Ineans of support o?
. _'-\.. No ~ir. Q. ''1ho did you feel 'ras then the head o-f
your fa1nily J? ..A... He \vas.
In conclusion per1nit the \vriter to state that a fa1nily
consists of two or n1ore persons living together as a
unit, and that "~hen a n1an in his twenties has done what
Tarbet has done to maintain the integrity and indepen-·
dence evidenced in this ease, and that the policy of
l~tah has historically been based on a liberal interpretation of the ho1nestead laws, and that the plaintiff and
respondent had all the opportunity to portect himself,
and Tarbet had none, then the decision and judgement
of the lo\Yer Court should be reversed.
Respectfully Submitted,
GEO. D. PRESTON
~~ttorney for Defendant and
Appellant, Thomas A. Tarbet.
Received copy of within
Brief at Logan, lTtah, on the
________ day of ____________________ , 1948.
I

Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Attorney for Defendants W. H. Stevvart, June S.
Spackrnan and Clare Spackn1an.
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